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Antitrust and competition laws lie at the nexus of international law and
business.' Since 1890, antitrust law has expanded from its origins of
regulating trusts in the United States to what is now a global body of law.
However, this expansion has not come without drawbacks. As the number
of worldwide competition review and enforcement agencies in both
developing and developed nations continues to increase,2 multinational
businesses contemplating mergers are faced with growing uncertainty and
transaction costs. These escalating costs have led business community
leaders to conclude "that greater harmonization of merger law enforcement,
at both the substantive and the procedural levels, would be of significant
benefit.",
3
The discussion and advocacy for the creation of an international
antitrust regime has been ongoing since the early twentieth century.4
Unfortunately, most attempts at international harmonization5 to this point
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. The author would like
to thank Dase Kim and Rebecca Stamey-White for all of their assistance during the
publication process and wishes his sister Hannah Hunt a speedy recovery.
American antitrust law is synonymous with competition law in the rest of the world.
2 See Diane P. Wood, Antitrust: Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 309,
309 (2005) (noting that "[w]e live in a world in which more than one hundred countries now
have national antitrust laws").
3 Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the
Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391, 399 (2002)
4 Id. at 392.
5 It is important to clarify the differences in critical terms used by commentators when
discussing changes to international competition law. Harmonization is "a supranational or
multilateral law" that in the competition context can apply to (1) competition rules; (2)
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are characterized by weak forms of voluntary cooperation.6 Efforts have
been made by various intergovernmental bodies to produce model codes or
principles for developing countries to adopt. For example, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") each
adopted non-binding competition codes.7 The International Competition
Network ("ICN") and the Global Competition Forum ("GCF") have also
made progress "in the direction of global convergence toward sound merger
practices and procedures" by developing eight guiding principles and three
recommended practices.8
As discussed in Part IV, the general problem with these proposals is
that they attempt to regulate the entire body of competition law. In addition
to merger review, competition law addresses horizontal restraints between
competitors at the domestic and worldwide levels,9 and vertical restraints
within a distribution chain.' ° This overly ambitious approach ultimately
results in little progress being made and justifies the more moderate
approach advanced in this Comment.
Part II of this Comment discusses the increasing presence of economic
analysis in antitrust law. Part III describes the various costs and benefits
resulting from overlapping multi-jurisdictional merger review. Part IV
describes several of the most notable proposals for remedying this
undesirable international situation. Part V argues that a more reasonable
and manageable step is to first create a supranational merger review body
utilizing U.S.-type economic analysis, before further attempts to harmonize
other aspects of international competition law are made. This would help to
reduce transaction costs to businesses and should result in a more globally
competition policy; or (3) enforcement procedures. See Sharon E. Foster, While America
Slept: The Harmonization of Competition Laws Based Upon The European Union Model, 15
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 467, 472 (2001). Convergence refers to "the movement towards the
standardization of laws." Id. Cooperation and coordination refers to "an agreement between
states, bilaterally or multilaterally, to assist each other in enforcing their laws." Id. These
concepts are not completely independent as "influential authorities ... look upon
cooperation and coordination as a method to achieve greater convergence and, ultimately,
harmonization." Id. at 493.
6 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.
L. REv. 343, 356 (1997).
7 See id. at 351-52.
8 Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Speech Before the International Competition Network: Guiding Principles and
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review 4 (Sept. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 200286.pdf.
9 The widely publicized 1970s uranium cartel is one example of an international
horizontal anticompetitive behavior.
10 MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 209-10
(Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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efficient level of merger regulation."' Part VI uses historical developments
in the European Union as a predictive model for the success of the proposal
in Part V. Finally, Part VII concludes by discussing how this proposal
changes our view of international law and the implications of its suggested
convergence of antitrust and international trade issues at the WTO.
II. ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST
The U.S approach to evaluating antitrust issues in merger reviews has
evolved from a set of vague standards into a rules-based 12 system utilizing
increasingly sophisticated economic analysis to dictate certain outcomes.
Conversely, other governments around the world have remained mired in a
standards-based approach to the enforcement of competition law when
reviewing mergers. Comparing these so-called "rules versus standards'
14
approaches demonstrates both the utility of a rules-based economic
approach to antitrust analysis and enforcement 15 in merger review as well as
the problems inherent in using vague standards to accomplish the same
goals. 16  Applying bright-line rules in the merger context is particularly
important because they "provide guidance and ensure businesses that not
every action they take, or eve 7 merger they propose, will be subject to
arbitrary and exacting scrutiny."
7
A. Economic Analysis in U.S. Antitrust Law
Since the enactment of the first comprehensive antitrust law in 1890,
judges and enforcement agencies in the United States have grappled with
11 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1501 (1998).
12 Rules can be defined as "specifications of liability criteria in formal, seemingly
precise, and usually short directives." Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust
Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 55 (2007). On the other hand, "a standard may
entail leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the
adjudicator." Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 560 (1992). For example, a rule might create a 55 mile per hour speed limit on
freeways while a standard "might prohibit driving at an excessive speed." Id.
13 It is important to reiterate that this statement is limited to the merger review context.
Others argue that as a general matter, antitrust law in the United States "finds itself in the
midst of a creeping transition from rules to standards." Crane, supra note 12, at 50.
14 See Guzman, supra note 11 (reviewing literature of the "rules versus standards" issue).
15 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 129 (1978) (asserting that "rules can
be devised which reflect and resolve the tension between productive inefficiency and
allocative efficiency accurately enough for the law to confer a net benefit").
16 See Crane, supra note 12, at 85. Crane notes that "[o]ne strong advantage of rules over
standards is predictability, which matters most when one is trying to incentivize appropriate
behavior."
17 See Kenneth Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of
Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 420 (2005).
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defining the goals of antitrust. After years of uncertainty, the publication of
Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox in 1978 fundamentally changed the
nature of antitrust analysis in American jurisprudence by casting the nature
of all analysis in terms of economics.1 8 The following section traces these
developments in further detail.
1. Background
According to Judge Bork, "the federal courts in over eighty years have
never settled for long upon a definitive statement of the [antitrust] law's
goals." 19 Bork reached the conclusion that "antitrust is a cornucopia of
social values, all of them rather vague and undefined" after an extensive
survey of judicial opinions and scholarly and professional commentaries.20
Noting the problematic nature of this vagueness in defining the
fundamental goals of antitrust, Bork forcefully argued that "[t]he
responsibility of the federal courts for the integrity and virtue of law
requires that they take consumer welfare as the sole value that guides
antitrust decisions.' In sum, Bork proposed using economics to solve the
problems inherent in the vague antitrust standards.
2. Modern Approach
Based on Bork's seminal work and argument presented above,
"rigorous economic analysis of markets has become the norm for both the
agencies and the courts . . . . Today, courts and antitrust enforcers rely
much less on structural presumptions and more on the consumer welfare
standard of anticompetitive harm. 22 Under the "consumer welfare model,"
mergers create power to restrict output and cut costs. 23  The consumer
welfare model balances the "dead-weight loss" to consumers that occurs
when producers restrict output (i.e., "productive inefficiency") with the
gains that consumers experience from cost reductions as a result of the
merger (i.e., "allocative efficiency").24 According to Bork, the consumer
welfare model clearly illustrates "the relationship between allocative and
18 BORK, supra note 15, at 50.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 51.
22 Geoffrey A. Manne & E. Marcellus Williamson, Hot Docs vs. Cold Economics: The
Use and Misuse of Business Documents in Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication, 47 ARiz.
L. REv. 609, 614 (2005).
23 See BORK, supra note 15, at 107.
24 See id. at 108; see also Crane, supra note 12, at 84 ("In the current dominant paradigm,
antitrust law is supposed to deter firms from engaging in collusive or exclusionary conduct




productive efficiencies in determining consumer wealth., 25 In short, "it is
efficiency, not competition, that is the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws.,
26
B. Vagueness in EU Competition Law Standards
On the surface, it may appear that both the U.S. and EU competition
laws are directed at increasing consumer welfare.27 In reality, the EU
standards-based approach relies on social and political factors, which
influence the decision-making process.28 For example, in 2001 the
European Community created headline news by deciding to block the 2001
GE/Honeywell merger that had already been approved by the U.S.
regulators. 29 This decision was largely based on protection of "national
champions" in EU member-states. 30 Thus, the European Union's lack of an
analytical framework based on economics allowed for a politically-
motivated decision based on vague notions of competitor protection.
The standards-based approach of EU merger regulation also tends to
view efficiencies as an outcome that may have negative competitive
consequences.31 For example, one position taken by the European Union in
blocking the GE/Honeywell merger was that the efficiencies gained from
the merger would allow GE to increase its dominant position. This stands
25 See BORK, supra note 15, at 109.
26 Additionally, the use of economics allow for a "rule of law" with high predictability
and strict limits for the discretionary scope of authorities, which can be crucial for the
effectiveness of policies. See Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy
with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per Se Rules vs. Rule of Reason," 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215, 221 (2006). Thus, even when courts in the United States
utilize a standards-based "rule of reason" analysis in reaching a decision for a particular
case, the rationale for the decision is typically based on a more rule-like economic analysis.
27 See Erik Johansen, I Say Antitrust; You Say Anticompetitive: Why Bridging the Divide
Between U.S. and EU Competition Policy Makes Economic Sense, 24 PENN. ST. INT'L L.
REV. 331, 332 (2005).
28 Id.
29 Katherine B. Forrest, The State ofE. U/U.S. Merger Coordination, 1565 PLI/Corp 223,
231 (2006). See Commission Decision 2004/134, Case COMP/M.2220, General
Electric/Honeywell, 2004 O.J. (L 48) 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition
/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220en.pdf; see also W. Adam Hunt, United States and
European Union Merger Reviews: Convergence or Collision?, http://www.abanet.org/abanet
/common/login/securedarea.cfm?areaType=member&role=abanetmo&url=/yld/mo/mergerus
veurope.shtml (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (login required).
30 See Hal. R. Varian, Economic Scene: In Europe, G.E. and Honeywell Ran Afoul of
19th-Century Thinking, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001, at C2 ("When evaluating a merger,
United States antitrust officials tend to focus on the benefits to consumers, while European
regulators give substantial weight to the impact on competitors, especially if they are
'national champions').
31 See Ilene Knable Gotts et al., Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of Reason: The
US./E.U. Treatment of Transatlantic Mergers, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 489-90
(2005).
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in marked contrast to U.S. laws that refuse to "protect competitors from
mergers that will make the merged firm more efficient, even if they fear
being forced from the market as a result. '32  Although the new EU
Horizontal Merger Guidelines discussed below make efficiencies an
important element of the merger review analysis, 33 the EU is arguably still
more sympathetic to the concerns of competitors. 34 This standards-based
approach, failure to take economics into account, and resultant blocking of
a globally efficient merger impose a high cost not only on society, but on
consumers affected by the European Union's decision.
C. Convergence of the United States and the European Union Approaches
Despite the differences outlined above, the European Union has moved
closer to a U.S.-type approach to merger review. On May 1, 2004, the
European Commission promulgated a new Merger Regulation and issued
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.3 These actions were described as achieving
"a major evolutionary leap towards a consumer welfare standard," bringing
the underlying EU merger review policy much closer to that of the United
States.36
Additionally, the U.S. and EU enforcement agencies have a history of
formal cooperation in competition law policy dating back to an agreement
signed in 1991.37  As a result of the notification, consultation, and
coordination of merger review between jurisdictions, the United States and
the European Union have avoided inconsistent results in most cases. 38
However, the European Court of First Instance's recent decision in
Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities39
demonstrates that significant philosophical disparities still exist between the
32 William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long Way From
Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 533,536 (2002).
33 See Gotts et al., supra note 31, at 496.
31 Id. at 493.
35 See id. at 491; see also Council Regulation 139/2004, On the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1.
36 See Gotts et al., supra note 31, at 490.
37 See Kathryn Fugina, Comment, Merger Control Review in the United States and the
European Union: Working Towards Conflict Resolution, 26 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 471, 490
n. 162 (2006).
38 Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Address at the Canadian Bar Association, Annual Fall Conference on Competition Law:
International Antitrust in the Bush Administration 4 (Sept. 21, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9100.pdf (referring to the "close collaboration on
facts, analysis and remedies between the Antitrust Division and the European Commission in
the Sprint/MCI, Alcoa/Reynolds, MCI/WorldCom, and Dresser/Halliburton investigations").





two jurisdictions, at least with respect to civil non-merger cases. 40  It
remains to be seen whether the public sparring by antitrust officials from
both sides of the Atlantic 41 will jeopardize the progress made in
harmonizing merger reviews between the United States and the European
Union since the failed GE/Honeywell merger.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INCREASED MULTI-
JURISDICTIONAL MERGER REVIEW
The economic modeling used by U.S. antitrust authorities for
evaluating mergers provides evidence that some mergers bring a net benefit
to society and serve the fundamental goal of allocating society's scarce
resources in the most efficient manner possible. However, the multiplicity
of international merger review authorities increases transaction costs to
companies contemplating transnational mergers. Nor does the potential for
increased costs end there. As explained in Part III.C, the true danger comes
from the possibility of blocking globally efficient mergers or keeping
companies from attempting lower-value mergers in the first place.
A. Quantification of Merger Benefits
Under the consumer welfare model presented in Part II.A. above, the
key factor in whether a merger is approved or not is the merged firm's
impact on consumer welfare. 4f In practice, mergers are evaluated by taking
the sum of its effects on total consumer and producer surplus.43 When the
net benefit outweighs any potential anticompetitive harm, then society's
scarce resources are properly allocated, and society as a whole is better
off.
44
40 Good summaries of the lengthy decision are available online. See, e.g., Press Release,
European Comm'n, Directorate-Gen. Press and Commc'ns, The Court of First Instance
Essentially Upholds the Commission's Decision Finding that Microsoft Abused Its
Dominant Position (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu
/communiques/cp07/aff/cp070063en.pdf.
41 See EU Official Lambasts U.S. Justice Dept on Microsoft, REUTERS, Sept. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSL 1926927820070919?feed
Type=RSS&feedName=politicsNews. Specifically European Union Competition
Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated "[ilt is totally unacceptable that a representative of the
U.S. administration [Department of Justice Assistant Attorney General Thomas Barnett]
criticized an independent court of law outside its jurisdiction." Id.
42 See Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, The Efficiency Defense in Merger Law:
Economic Foundations and Recent Canadian Developments, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 474
(2005). Closely related to this is the idea of the "Pareto Principle." This refers to the notion
that "if a merger makes some individuals better off by increasing their surplus as consumers
or their profits as shareholders without harming others, it should be allowed." Id.
41 See id. at 475.
44 The increased gains to society from a firn facing a fall in the cost of production as the
result of a merger can be quantified because more goods are produced at a lower unit cost,
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Other potential benefits from mergers include the creation of new
products or innovations. There may also be other economic savings such as
increased research and development activities, which can be extremely
important in stimulating long-term economic growth.45
B. Increased Transaction Costs to Global Businesses
Compliance costs to merging parties are often cited by commentators
as a primary justification supporting the need for harmonization of global
competition law.46 Yet the typical argument only makes brief recitals
regarding the benefits to businesses that would theoretically flow from
integrated worldwide multi-jurisdictional merger review.4 7 A typical
statement is: "In the area of mergers and acquisitions, compliance with
competition laws is becoming an increasingly expensive and time
consuming aspect of transnational business. 48
A recent study commissioned by the International Bar Association
provides excellent empirical support for these arguments. 49  The study
reveals that the typical international merger is worth E3.9 billion, requires
six filings with a merger review authority, and generates on average E3.3
million in external merger review costs. 50  These costs begin with
determining what jurisdictions require notification of the merger. 1 Other
costs include attorney fees, filing fees, document production costs, fees for
which increases overall welfare. "Consumers gain because the cost of the good has fallen,
allowing them to either purchase more of the good for the same amount of money or
purchase the same amount of the good for less. Producers with market power benefit
because their profits increase." Guzman, supra note 11, at 1509.
45 See ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK SUBGROUP, ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP, PROJECT ON
MERGER GUIDELINES: REPORT FOR THE THIRD ICN ANNUAL CONFERENCE IN SEOUL ch. 6
(2004) [hereinafter ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP], available at http://www
.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference 2nd merida_2003/amg-cha
p6_efficiencies.pdf.
46 See, e.g., Dane Holbrook, Comment, International Merger Control Convergence:
Resolving Multijurisdictional Review Problems, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 345,
349 (2002).
47 See, e.g., Jennifer R. Johnson, It's a Small World After All: Proposed Solutions for
Global Antitrust in a System of National Laws, I SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 118, 118 (2003).
48 Waller, supra note 6, at 385.
49 Press Release, Int'l Bar Ass'n, IBA/ABA Survey Identifies Costs to Business of
Competition Referrals on Cross-Border M&A Deals (June 23, 2003) [hereinafter IBA Press
Release], available at http://archive.ibanet.org/news/Newsltem.asp?newslD=99; see also
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A TAx ON MERGERS? SURVEYING THE TIME AND COSTS TO
BUSINESS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL MERGER REVIEWS (2003), available at
http://www.pwc.com/Extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/9A1944672D36773680256EDF003
87C15.
50 See IBA Press Release, supra note 49.
51 See Holbrook, supra note 46, at 349.
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retaining local counsel, and translation costs. 52 Of the E3.3 million, 65% of
this figure is from legal fees, 19% from filing fees, and 14% in fees for
other advisers.53 Additionally, the average merger takes seven months to
complete, although in certain jurisdictions it can take much longer.54
The data also indicates that prices increase dramatically when a
competition authority expresses concern regarding potential anticompetitive
effects of a proposed merger.5 5 Specifically,
[I]n-depth reviews are eight to ten times more expensive than those
subject only to initial review. The latter generate average external
costs of E545,000 (or El 10,000 per filing). Deals subject to one or
more in-depth reviews incur average external costs of E5.4 million
per transaction (on average, C6 million-plus per deal with
management and staff time added in). Larger, more complex deals
incur significantly higher costs. PricewaterhouseCoopers' research
shows that a number of major deals, subject to at least one in-depth
review, incur external costs of€1O million-plus.
56
Furthermore, if countries without competition laws adopt new laws
and continue to increase the number of jurisdictions with their own merger
review policies, these costs will continue to increase. 7 One potential
danger of these increasing costs is that the compliance costs for merging
parties may become so great that an otherwise pro-competitive merger is
abandoned by the parties.58 Because of this, "[i]t is hard to disagree with
the assessment of the business community that greater harmonization of
merger law enforcement, at both the substantive and the procedural levels,
would be of significant benefit." 59
52 See id. (citing INT'L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
ANTITRUST 92 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm).
53 See IBA Press Release, supra note 49.
54 Id.; see also J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, A Comment on the Estimated
Costs of Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Reviews, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2003,
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/03/09/comment.pdf (noting that
"Brazil, followed by the United States, emerged as the jurisdictions most often involving the
longest reviews. The average review durations for the transactions where these jurisdictions
were last to complete their reviews, were 11.9 and 8.8 months, respectively. Even more
alarming is the finding that the slowest reviews (i.e., top quartile) had an average duration of
16 months, which far exceeds the timing objectives of most merging parties.").
55 IBA Press Release, supra note 49.
56 id.
57 See Holbrook, supra note 46, at 349.
51 See id. at 347.
59 See Wood, supra note 3, at 399.
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C. Indirect Costs of Blocking Globally Efficient Mergers
A model for the "optimal global policy" for merger review has been
defined as "the [policy] that allows all activities for which the global change
in profits plus the global change in consumer surplus is positive. 60
Because this model suggests that countries will sometimes block globally
beneficial mergers, 61 businesses might be deterred from even attempting
welfare enhancing mergers in the first place. These costs could ultimately
be greater than the increased transaction costs to businesses discussed
above in Part III.B. Ultimately it is these "total welfare costs",62 that
provide the strongest support for greater harmonization of merger review at
the international level.63
IV. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR HARMONIZATION OF
COMPETITION LAWS
In order to address the problems identified in Part II, commentators
have proposed a variety of solutions ranging from bilateral cooperation
agreements to World Trade Organization ("WTO") oversight of
international competition law.64 The following section discusses several of
the most popular approaches to harmonizing global competition law along
with their inherent limitations.
A. Bilateral Cooperation
Bilateral cooperation agreements are formal agreements between two
countries regarding the procedure for notification, information sharing, and
60 Guzman, supra note 11, at 1512; see also Foster, supra note 5, at 484-85 (stating that
"the indirect costs, such as the impact a delay has on the welfare of the global market, are
potentially high").
61 See Guzman, supra note 11 at 1517 ("[C]ountry B will sometimes block an activity
that increases global welfare because it does not take into account the gains that would be
enjoyed by firms in country A.").
62 The total welfare cost "considers a merger's likely effect on all members of society,
not simply the consumers of products produced by the merging firms." Kenneth Heyer,
Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why not the Best? 3 (U.S. Dep't of Justice Econ.
Analysis Group Discussion Paper 06-8, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust
/at-source/pdf/references/heyer-ken-06-8.pdf.
63 It should be noted that this analysis of overall economic efficiency is somewhat
different than the maximization of consumer welfare discussed supra Part II.A.2. "The
critical difference is that economy-wide efficiency involves accounting for the effects of
actions on the welfare of both producers and consumers, while a consumer-welfare standard
considers only the latter." Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 7 (2007). Some commentators have already argued in
favor of this approach. See, e.g., Heyer, supra note 17.
64 See, e.g., Eun Sup Lee, Anti-competitive Practices as Trade Barriers Used by Korea
and Japan, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW 177, 180 (2004).
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cooperation between government officials. 65  The bilateral cooperation
agreement between the United States and EU 6 6 has increased the
consistency of outcomes in trans-Atlantic merger reviews and has made the
entire merger review process more efficient. 67 The success of this and other
bilateral agreements has led scholars to comment that the approach is likely
the most effective option for the global marketplace 68 because of the greater
consistency in outcomes.69
Although helpful, bilateral cooperation agreements are still not the
globally optimal policy for merger review.70  In the long-run, bilateral
cooperation agreements offer little hope for creating a harmonized
worldwide competition law, because they do not sufficiently reduce the
number of jurisdictions exercising control over mergers. If only four states
in the world (A, B, C, and D) had merger review regulations and states A
and B entered into a bilateral cooperation agreement and states C and D
entered into a similar agreement, then both the relative and absolute
efficiency gains would be substantial.
However, similar efficiency gains are unlikely in today's world with
approximately eighty jurisdictions that have some form of merger review
and control mechanisms.7' Even if states 1 through 40 each entered into a
bilateral cooperation agreement with a counterpart in states 41 through 80
(i.e. state I entered into an agreement with state 41, 2 with 42, etc.) there
would still be forty jurisdictions conducting merger reviews. Although this
represents a fifty percent decrease in the number of jurisdictions conducting
merger reviews, in absolute terms, having forty different merger review
jurisdictions conducting merger reviews is still quite burdensome from a
business perspective. There is also the additional problem that the
cooperating states would not always reach the same decision in each merger
review. 72  Therefore, uncertainty and transaction costs to businesses
65 See Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the EC Commission in Extraterritorial
Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and Its Impact on Transatlantic Cooperation in
Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 263, 299 (2002).
66 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition
Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-EC, 1995 O.J. (L 95) 47. This agreement was subsequently
amended in 1998. See Agreement Between the European Communities and the Government
of the United States of America on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the
Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, Apr. 6, 1998, U.S.-EC, 1998 O.J. (L 173) 28.
67 See Stevens, supra note 65, at 299.
68 See Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of Global Competition Governance:
Lessons From the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 769, 772-73 (2004).
69 DABBAH, supra note 10, at 222.
70 See Guzman, supra note 11, at 1512.
71 See Stevens, supra note 65, at 302 n. I (noting that "[t]oday, some 80 countries have a
form of merger review, and the figure is expected to be 200 countries by 2025").
72 The disparate result reached by U.S. and EU regulators in the GE/Honeywell case
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contemplating mergers would still be significant.
The number of states involved in a bilateral agreement forms another
impediment to producing a globally efficient level of antitrust enforcement.
So long as a proposed merger produces no anticompetitive effects in the
states reviewing the merger, the countries involved will approve the merger
regardless of the potential anticompetitive effects for countries that are not
part of the cooperation agreement. As stated in a recent WTO report,
countries "not tak[ing] into account adverse effects on the welfare of
producers and consumers abroad may lead to situations where the
enforcement of national competition law will not adequately take into
account the interests of trading partners. 73 In sum, bilateral agreements are
valuable but should not be relied on exclusively or as a replacement for
harmonization.74
B. Regional Agreements
When multiple jurisdictions form regional agreements to govern
antitrust and merger review policy, there is a greater chance for improving
certainty and reducing transaction costs than a situation with a multiplicity
of bilateral agreements. The European Union arguably has the largest
regional agreement with respect to competition law. The twenty-seven
Member States consent to decisions made by the Directorate-General IV,
which in turn acts pursuant to the EU Merger Regulation.75
Some commentators have argued for using an "amalgamated
approach" 76 to merger review. This approach suggests that harmonization
of merger review can be achieved by combining the enforcement efforts of
various regional coalitions.77  This approach also allows for greater
consideration of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a merger before a
decision is made.
The principal limitation to this strategic approach for achieving a
substantive convergence in merger review policy is that it lacks a unifying
standard for joining the disparate policies between regional actors. In other
words:
A lack of consensus as to the ultimate aims and goals of antitrust law
means that there is a significant likelihood that a merger will be
provides strong empirical support for this statement.
73 DABBAH, supra note 10, at 229.
74 See Waller, supra note 6, at 404.
75 See Council Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1. See generally William Elland,
The Merger Control Regulation, 3 EUR. CoMp. L. REv. 111 (1990); Derek Ridyard, An
Economic Perspective on the EC Merger Regulation, 6 EuR. COMp. L. Rcv. 247 (1990).




reviewed and perceived differently by different antitrust authorities,
with the consequential risk of inconsistency and conflict when one
authority purports to exercise extraterritorial control.78
Unfortunately this leaves us no better off than under the situation with
a multiplicity of bilateral agreements.
C. WTO Oversight
79
Many commentators support greater involvement for the WTO in
international competition law and policy issues. Foremost among their
arguments is the notion that anti-competitive behavior by private firms
could impair "the expansion of world trade and economic development in
individual countries."
The first WTO efforts to address competition law issues came in 1996
at the Singapore Ministerial Conference. At this conference, the WTO
created the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy ("WTO Working Group") 81 to consider whether the
regulation of anti-competitive practices should be added to the WTO
framework.82  Further progress was made at the 2001 WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha, where trade representatives recognized the need for a
multilateral approach to improve the development of international trade
policies.83  However, the representatives decided to put off any further
decisions until the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancin in 2003.84
Unfortunately the WTO Working Group at the 2003 Ministerial Conference
in Cancfin was also unable to reach consensus on any of the competition
issues.85
Finally, on August 1, 2004, the WTO General Council adopted the
"July 2004 package" which decided that the issue of convergence in
78 See Stevens, supra note 65, at 284.
79 See generally Douglas K. Schnell, Note, All Bundled Up: Bringing The Failed
GE/Honeywell Merger In From the Cold, 37 CORNELL INT' L L.J. 217, 252 (2004).
80 DABBAH, supra note 10, at 207.
81 See WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy-
History, Mandates and Decisions, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/comp-e/history-e
.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id. However, the representatives did agree to instruct the WTO Working Group to
focus on the clarification of a broad range of core competition issues, including
"transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness; provisions on hardcore cartels;
modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building." Id.
" See id.
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competition policy would no longer take place within the WTO. 6 Since
this decision by the WTO General Council, no further efforts have been
made to address competition policy at the WTO and the WTO Working
87Group is currently inactive.
D. OECD Oversight
The thirty nations that comprise the OECD consist of mainly Western
industrial countries. In 1967, these countries agreed to a notification and
cooperation process whenever competition matters affected the interests of
OECD members.88 This type of agreement is now known as "information
sharing" or "soft harmonization., 89 Despite creating "aspirational texts" on
approaches to competition law, none of the OECD's proposals were
intended to create legally binding obligations.9" Instead the goals are
limited to improving communication on competition issues. 91
The main limitations of using the OECD as a venue for the
harmonization of competition law are that its membership does not include
many developing countries and it lacks a dispute resolution mechanism.
92
E. International Competition Network ("ICN")
In 2001 the ICN was founded "to provide a venue for all competition
agencies worldwide to discuss issues of mutual interest with a view toward
promoting cooperation and policy convergence., 93  Unlike other
organizations, the ICN does not have a permanent staff or headquarters.
94
The ICN members work together and with other organizations from around
the world to promote a set of best practices in competition enforcement.
Members address the entire range of competition law issues in addition to
multi-jurisdictional merger review. 95
Like the WTO, the ICN established a Merger Working Group.96 But
86 See id.
87 See WTO Working Group, supra note 8 1.
88 See Honorable Pamela Jones Harbour, Developments in Competition Law in the
European Union and the United States: Harmony and Conflict, 19-SPG INT'L L. PRACTICUM
3, 6 (2006).
89 See Lee, supra note 64 at 181.
90 See id. at 181-82.
91 See Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
355, 371 (2004).
92 See Foster, supra note 5, at 497.
93 Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence: A Positive View, 19-SUM
ANTITRUST 25, 27 (2005).
94 See id.
9' See id.
96 John J. Parisi, Comment, International Regulation of Mergers: More Convergence,
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unlike the WTO, the ICN has made substantial progress in the field of
competition law since its inception. One of the ICN's primary
accomplishments is the compilation of a set of best practices for merger
notification as well as review procedures.97 The ICN
has also encouraged and monitored implementation of its
recommended practices; in fact, over fifty percent of ICN members
with merger review laws have made or planned revisions to their
merger regimes that bring them into greater conformity with the
recommended practices. Such efforts will lead to convergence,
marking merger review easier for merger parties and enforcers
alike.
98
Unfortunately, the ICN suffers from the same underlying problem as
other solutions; its rules are non-binding on its members. In any situation
without rules, enforcers, or dispute settlement mechanisms,99 there are no
assurances that countries will abide by any of the potentially useful
guidelines or recommendations. Until a workable approach is identified
that produces a globally optimal amount of antitrust enforcement,
increasing certainty and reducing compliance costs, continued debate
should occur.' 00
V. NEW PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
MERGER REVIEW PROBLEMS
Proposals for an international competition law have been discussed
since the League of Nations in the early 1900s. 10 1 As noted in Part IV, most
of these proposals suffer from the same flaw of attempting to provide a
framework that encompasses all aspects of competition law. Because of
this and other challenges, 10 2 many commentators "do not expect to see the
creation of a single worldwide competition enforcement agency in our
Less Conflict, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509, 525-26 (2005).
97 See Harbour, supra note 88, at 7.
98 Id.
99 Parisi, supra note 96, at 525-26.
100 For an excellent discussion of the problem with voluntary information sharing
agreements see Guzman, supra note 91, at 370 (noting in part that "[a]lthough these
information-sharing agreements play an important role in international antitrust enforcement,
they are not and cannot be a solution to the problem of international cooperation.").
101 See Kenneth J. Hamner, The Globalization of Law: International Merger Control and
Competition Law in the United States, the European Union, Latin America and China, 11 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 385, 403 (citing Andre Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in International
Merger Control, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 233 (2000)).
102 In addition to the sheer number of issues within the realm of competition law,
additional barriers include the sovereignty of nation states. See Harbour, supra note 88, at 4.
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lifetimes."' 3  The following section argues that the creation of a more
limited merger review authority with a U.S.-type approach that uses
economic analysis to merger review is a more realistic proposal for
achieving a convergence in multi-jurisdictional merger review.
A. Overview
This section provides an overview for this Comment's proposal of a
new international merger review authority ("IMRA"). Unlike criminal
enforcement of anticompetitive behavior, "[m]ergers, joint ventures, and
strategic alliances.., involve the integration of resources; hence, they have
the ability to generate real efficiencies."' 4 By limiting the proposal for
harmonization of competition law to the area of merger review, gains from
harmonization can be realized more quickly than through implementation of
a more far-reaching proposal. As an additional benefit, this modest initial
implementation still provides for the possibility of long-term substantive
convergence in additional areas of competition law.
In the first stage of development, the IMRA could act as a
clearinghouse for information regarding pre-merger notification and filing
requirements. In other words, it would be a "one-stop-shop" for businesses
contemplating international mergers. The second stage of development
would be the adoption of a limited set of merger review policies. In this
way, the organization would develop a common threshold for evaluating the
net global benefit or harm of a given merger. Key to this would be the
focus on merger efficiencies that can offset potential anticompetitive effects
of a merger. The IMRA would also share the core tenets of modem
antitrust law with respect to the goal of increasing consumer welfare, and
the importance of utilizing economic analysis.'
0 5
The last stage of the IMRA proposal would involve the creation of a
dispute resolution body for competition law within the WTO's dispute
resolution mechanism. This feature of the proposal would make the IMRA
one of only a handful of international organizations with an ability to
exercise binding authority over non-state actors. 
106
The IMRA proposal advanced in this Comment is broader than the
103 Id. But see Gotts et al., supra note 3 1, at 508 (noting that "[i]f competition officials
continue to work together, bilaterally and through multilateral fora such as the ICN, to
streamline and coordinate their merger review processes both substantively and
procedurally, and to develop further the legal and economic principles underpinning those
regulatory frameworks, we may yet enter an age of reason in global merger review").
104 See ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP, supra note 45, at 3.
105 See Tritell, supra note 93, at 26.
106 See Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 89 (2005).
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worldwide pre-merger notification regime proposed by Andre Fiebig.107 It
would also go further than projects limited to non-binding best-practices
that rely on the voluntary actions of governments around the world. 08 At
the same time, the narrow focus of this proposal on merger review and
clearance is still more limited than a supranational antitrust code governing
all aspects of international competition law. Commentators have noted that
due to the large number of jurisdictions with pre-merger notification
systems, some degree of analytical harmonization is desirable at the
international level.10 9 While the world may not ,yet be ready for a
comprehensive set of multilateral competition rules," now may very well
be the perfect opportunity to develop a set of multilateral rules for
transnational merger review.
B. Step One: Procedural Agreement
An entire article could be devoted to a comprehensive discussion of
procedural reforms necessary to implement the IMRA proposal. For the
purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to highlight the main issues that
should be considered in any merger review regime.
The first important procedural issue to consider is how large a merger
must be before it is subject to the worldwide merger review process. This is
an important issue because the vast majority of mergers are approved after
submitting the preliminary filing fees and documents."' Therefore the
ultimate "turnover" figure should be set at a sufficiently high level where
only the largest mergers are subject to an in-depth review. The rationale for
this is that the largest mergers have the greatest potential for producing sub-
optimal levels of efficiency if anticompetitive. When considering the
immense size of the worldwide market, small mergers, even if
anticompetitive, will only have a de minimis impact on worldwide
efficiency.
An alternative way for determining which mergers to subject to the
worldwide review would be based on the number of countries the proposed
merger impacts. As discussed throughout this Comment, one goal of the
worldwide merger review should be to reduce the number of redundant
filings in multiple jurisdictions for each discrete merger. For example, if a
merger triggered the filing requirements in seven countries, it might be a
suitable candidate for a unified, worldwide review. An added benefit of
using this approach is that you are more likely to correctly estimate the pro-
107 See Fiebig, supra note 101, at 247 (arguing for the creation of a pre-merger
notification unit in the WTO).
108 James, supra note 38, at 8-10.
109 See Tritell, supra note 93, at 27.
"10 See id. at 25.
111 Forrest, supra note 29, at 230.
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and anti-competitive effects of a transnational merger with inputs from
multiple countries sharing information." 12
Filing fees are another critical issue in any merger review scheme.
Like any other antitrust agency, a worldwide merger review authority
would need adequate funding to carry out its mission. 1 3  One funding
possibility is for the proposed agency to receive funding from member
governments like the funding structure of the United Nations. However, the
cost of merger review is typically paid for by fees from the merging
parties.1 4  A possible solution would be to have a baseline level of
government support, with a sliding scale of fees based on transaction
sizes. 115
C. Step Two: Substantive Agreement and Adoption of U.S.-Style Economic
Analysis
A critical aspect of this proposal is the need for substantive
convergence in merger review policy. As commentators have noted, "any
attempt to create a 'global standard' within antitrust law and policy could
be doomed to failure" without consensus as to the goals of antitrust law. 
16
The existence of disparate policy goals between review authorities in
different jurisdictions is precisely why divergent outcomes are so likely to
occur. 117 It follows that for true harmonization to occur, countries must first
agree on the goals of antitrust regulation.' 1
8
1. The Argument for Increased Economic Analysis
By adopting the U.S. economic-efficiency approach as a worldwide
efficiency standard, 119 and economic analysis more generally, costly
112 Information-sharing can present unique problems for antitrust enforcement officials,
since some nations have enacted laws designed to prevent the sharing of confidential
business information between antitrust enforcement officials in different jurisdictions. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to assume that even exchange of non-confidential
information (i.e. market share data) would still aid worldwide analysis of potential merger
effects.
113 See Holbroook, supra note 46, at 371.
114 See id. at 372.
115 See id. at 373.
116 DABBAH, supra note 10, at 51.
117 See Schnell, supra note 79, at 253.
118 See Stephen Schmitz, The European Commission's Decision in GE/Honeywell and
the Question of the Goals ofAntitrust Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 539, 588 (2002).
119 See Edward M. Graham, Economic Considerations in Merger Review, in ANTITRUST
GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 56 (Simon J. Evenett et
al. eds., 2000) (arguing that efficiency should be the primary consideration in merger
review); see also Daniel Gifford & Thomas Sullivan, Can International Antitrust Be Saved
for the Post-Boeing Merger World? A Proposal to Minimize International Conflict and to
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divergences in substantive policy can be avoided by providing greater
certainty to businesses contemplating transnational mergers. Currently,
worldwide competition enforcement agencies treat merger efficiencies
inconsistently.
A number of factors influence how merger efficiencies are treated,
including:
[T]he nature of the particular economy in question, the degree to
which it is integrated with the economies of other trading nations, its
historical economic experience with competition and competition
law, the goals of its competition law and the economic theory
background, the extent of regulation and deregulation, and its size.
Despite these inconsistencies, it has been argued that nations should
recognize the increase in economic growth and development resulting from
mergers and the importance of evaluating the role of efficiencies in the
merger review process. 122
In the United States, the creation of efficiencies can heavily influence
the ultimate approval of a merger because of the possibility for lowering
prices, which is a pro-competitive outcome. 123 In other words, U.S. laws
will not protect competitors simply because the merged firm will be a
stronger and more efficient competitor. 1
24
2. Potential Pitfalls
Not all commentators view efficiencies as a positive factor when
reviewing mergers. 125 Because of this,
[t]here is also a difficult burden facing the parties to a merger who
seek to argue the pro-competitive efficiency-enhancing elements of a
transaction. The parties must define and demonstrate the size and
nature of anticipated efficiencies, often at a very preliminary stage in
their due diligence and business planning, and certainly before they
have the opportunity to fully assess the reality of the integration
Rescue Antitrust from Misuse, 45 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 55 (2000), available at 2000 WL
24952762.
120 See ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP, supra note 45, at 2. Factors "includ[e] how they
should be factored into merger review, what kinds of efficiencies should be considered, and
whether efficiencies should be discounted as post-merger market shares approach
uncomfortably high levels." Id.
"2' Id. at 1.
122 Id.
123 See Schnell, supra note 79, at 232-33.
124 Kolasky, supra note 32, at 536.
125 See ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP, supra note 45, at 3. The European Union's block
of the GE/Honeywell merger is typically cited as a practical example of this concept.
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challenges they may face.
126
Additionally, given the lack of experience that authorities in
developing countries have in evaluating merger-specific efficiencies, it is
quite possible that they will discount or dismiss the predicted efficiencies.
127
The proposed IMRA worldwide efficiency standard also runs the risk
of over-emphasizing the importance of merger efficiencies, since the
decision to approve or reject a merger is rarely based solely on the claimed
efficiencies resulting from the merger. 128 Furthermore, agencies and courts
sometimes ignore merger efficiencies, or treat them with hostility, which
can ultimately impact a firm's decision to attempt an international
merger. 129  Even in jurisdictions that support an efficiency defense,
concerns still arise when a merger would create a monopoly.
130
One way to resolve this potential problem is to conduct an ex post
evaluation of claimed merger efficiencies at six months and one year after
completion of the merger, similar to the FTC program to review merger
consent decrees.131 Although ex post implementation of structural remedies
could be difficult, it is not outside the realm of possibility. Ideally the
merged firm's pricing decisions should also be monitored because
efficiencies could give the merged firm an ability to actually increase the
post-merger prices, thereby harming consumer welfare.
32
D. The Final Step: Adding a Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Under the status quo, if a private firm in one nation (the "Blocked
Nation") that has approved a transnational merger is blocked from
completing a merger with a firm from another nation (the "Blocking
Nation"), the Blocked Nation has limited options for recourse. One option
is to retaliate by blocking the next merger proposed by a Blocking Nation's
firm based in that Blocked Nation's jurisdiction. Another possibility
involves increasing cooperation to limit the occurrence of reaching
divergent results in merger reviews between the two countries.133 If neither
126 Id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 4.
129 See id. at 5.
130 See Kim D.G. Alexander-Cook, Advisory Panel Releases Report on Efficiencies, THE
COMPETITOR, Dec. 2005, available at http://www.stikeman.com/pdf/publications
/CompDec05.pdf (noting "there is ample evidence that in a merger-to--monopoly situations,
the absence of competition leads the monopolist to generate its own inefficiency in the long
run, so that the eventual efficiency losses may outweigh any short-term efficiency gains").
131 Gotts et al., supra note 31, at 507.
132 Ken Heyer, supra note 17 at 404.
133 This was the path chosen by the United States and the European Union following the
European Union's decision to block the proposed GE/Honeywell merger. See supra Part
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of these options is appropriate, because, for example, cooperation is
impossible and the Blocked Nation does not have any large multinational
firms based within its borders, then a dispute settlement mechanism is
needed.1 34 In other words, "[t]he purpose of an effective dispute settlement
mechanism is to resolve disputes that cannot be resolved nationally."'
' 35
Because the proposed IMRA would involve many nations, these types
of disputes are bound to occur. The disputes are especially likely to arise
when the supranational merger review agency approves a globally efficient
merger, but the optimal result for a particular nation would be to block the
merger. 136 In these situations, I believe that using the pre-existing WTO
dispute settlement system (the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or
"DSU") is the most effective way to resolve these types of disputes. 37 One
benefit of this approach is that the WTO has already decided at least one
antitrust case.' 38 Utilizing the WTO's DSU is also consistent with other
international schemes that regulate member state compliance. 1
39
One reason for selecting the WTO as the dispute settlement
mechanism is that it is not realistic to separate international trade policies
from competition policies, given the substantial amount of overlap between
these two policies. 140 It is logical to include disputes over market access
available to firms contemplating transnational mergers because it is the goal
of organizations like the WTO to create free and fair trade opportunities for
all of its members. 141
In the international trade context, the WTO's DSU process gives an
injured state the ability to inflict costs on a "rogue state" by retaliating
II.c.
134 The extraterritorial application of national laws is also not a viable option because
only "economically strong states ... have the ability to coerce compliance through economic
sanctions." Foster, supra note 5, at 488.
135 See Holbrook, supra note 46, at 369.
136 See generally Guzman, supra note 11.
137 See Mark L. Movesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 1 (2003) ("The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ('DSU')
provides that disputes are to be resolved in adversarial proceedings before impartial panels
of experts.").
138 See Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004). However, one commentator cautions that "the world
competition regime is not closer because of Mexico Telecom." Eleanor M. Fox, The WTO's
First Antitrust Case-Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victor for Trade and Competition, 9 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 271, 291 (2006).
139 See Stewart, supra note 106, at 9-10.
140 See Lee, supra note 64, at 179; see also Foster, supra note 5 ("The problem today in
continuing to treat trade and competition laws as distinct from one another is that we are now
dealing with an increasingly global economic market.").
141 See Lee, supra note 64, at 177.
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against protectionist policies in the rogue state. 14  Because the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism retains an aspect of retaliation existing in the
status quo, political actors in the Blocking Nations could be forced to
confront the costs of shirking their free trade commitments.
143
Finally, limiting the dispute settlement issue to merger review and
clearance as proposed in this Comment holds promise for reopening the
discussion and negotiation of competition law issues described above.
VI. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL MODEL
This section proposes that the European Union should be used as a
model to study the future development of a worldwide "common
market,"1 45 and also as an administrative model for managing nation-states
within this worldwide common market.
A. The EU Model
Like other international regimes, the European Union functions by
pushing down directives to Member States, which implement domestic laws
and administrative decisions consistent with the directives and apply them
to non-state actors. 146  However, other decisions are made at the
Commission level with each Directorate instructed to monitor discrete
areas, and implement regulations. Like the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, EU regulations are only focused on the conduct of
states.147 With respect to the EU economy, the goal of EU policies is to
promote a single, unified market. 148
B. Implications for the Adoption of a Worldwide Efficiency Standard
One of the greatest challenges of implementing the IMRA proposal is
that "competition laws have traditionally reflected domestic views, taking
into consideration social, political, and economic perspectives."'' 49  An
international agreement requires nation-states to set aside some or all of
these considerations in order to reach an agreement. It is somewhat unclear
142 Jide 0. Nzelibe, Interest Groups, Power Politics, and the Risks of WTO Mission
Creep, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POE' 89, 90 (2004).
141 Id. at 90-91.
144 See supra Part III.C.
145 This is a new approach. The essence of this argumcnt is that like the nation-states of
Europe, which have created a single, unified "common market," the worldwide economy is
moving towards a single, unified "common market."
146 See Stewart, supra note 106, at 67-68.
147 See id. at 89.
148 Eleanor M. Fox, The End ofAntitrust Isolationism: The Vision of One World, 1992 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 221, 222-23 (1992).
149 Foster, supra note 5, at 481.
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as to the extent global actors are willing to do this.
Based on the EU model, harmonization of disparate laws and political
views in the merger setting appears to be possible. The European Union
has successfully harmonized competition law while encouraging other
states to adopt laws based on its model. 150  For example, the European
Union used the PHARE program to encourage former Soviet states to adopt
EU-type competition laws and trade agreements that comport with EU
competition standards. 151
Two additional factors support the notion that harmonization is
possible at the worldwide level. First, harmonization is occurring already
through the "soft harmonization" efforts of international groups like the
ICN. Second, states having an economic incentive to participate in the
international economy will modify their competition laws if necessary to
increase economic prosperity.' 52 The implication of the second factor is
that states will indeed participate in the worldwide common market, as long
as it is in their long-term economic interests.
The EU model also suggests a checklist of things to consider when
taking efficiencies into account. 153  Scholars of the checklist approach
emphasize (1) the calculation of baseline or minimum efficiencies and (2)
verification of actual efficiencies. 15 4 These scholars strongly argue that
these two factors should be explicitly and transparently identified and
evaluated in any merger review. This checklist approach demonstrates
that at least one way exists to implement the worldwide efficiency standard
proposed by the IMRA in Part V.
In closing, it is important to note that similar efforts to create a "one-
stop-shop" for merger reviews in the European Union were blocked in large
part by the efforts of the EU Member States. 156  If the twenty-seven
Member States of the European Union were able to block a regional version
of the merger clearinghouse envisioned in this Comment, then it is quite
possible that similar results could be obtained by a regional group of
countries outside of the European Union.
150 See id. at 469-70.
151 See id. at 475; see also Fiebig, supra note 101, at 236.
152 See Foster, supra note 5, at 474.
153 See DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR ECON. AND FIN. AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROPEAN
ECONOMY: THE EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL
(2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/european-economy
/2001/eers0501_en.pdf. The checklist "includes the choice of the welfare standard, whether
efficiencies can be viewed as an offence, and how efficiencies are passed on to consumers."
Id. at 1.
154 See id. at 2.
155 See id.
156 See Harbour, supra note 88, at 4.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Divergences in multi-jurisdictional merger review result in
unnecessarily high transaction costs to global businesses and may block
potentially beneficial mergers from ever occurring. By integrating global
merger review regimes, governments across the globe could take a modest
step towards harmonizing competition law policy. This would reduce
compliance costs for businesses while increasing certainty and reducing the
prices consumers pay for goods. In sum, it would create a more globally
optimal level of antitrust enforcement.
This Comment argues that the international community must achieve
greater harmony in terms of a fundamental set of principles used in merger
review to avoid holding businesses hostage to duplicative regulations and
review of the same transaction. In particular, this Comment argues that the
emphasis given by competition authorities to merger efficiencies must be
expanded and treated in a more uniform manner to provide greater certainty
to businesses dealing with the new global economy. The proposal
advanced by this Comment also seeks to combine the dispute settlements
procedures for worldwide trade and competition issues at the WTO.
Although national concerns will always produce somewhat different
policy goals and substantive rules, 157 the EU model predicts that a move
toward a global efficiency standard will succeed as long as it is in the long-
term economic interests of those nations involved and based on rules
supported by economics, rather than vague standards. Since the IMRA
proposal should produce the globally optimal level of merger control, it
stands to benefit all those that consent to its process. If successful, this
approach to global merger review and clearance promises "more efficient
and substantively sound antitrust enforcement that transcends national
borders, to the benefit of consumers all over the world."' 58
157 See Foster, supra note 5, at 502-03.
158 See James, supra note 38, at 10-11.
